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Abstract 
 
This paper explores the nature of principal liability in international criminal law. In 
prosecuting high-level leaders most responsible for crimes, both the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) have used modes of principal liability to convict high-level leaders. In 
examining the elements of joint criminal enterprise (JCE) and the control over the crime 
theory (control theory), this paper seeks to identify steps for the ICC to take in its future 
prosecutions. Whilst the ICC’s control theory is an appropriate mode of liability for the 
conviction of high-level leaders, the ICC must justify its recourse to the control theory. 
This paper questions whether the ICC can use the control theory as a source of law, 
identifies aspects of the ICC’s jurisprudence that should be clarified, and looks at 
indirect co-perpetration as a future tool of principal liability. If these steps are taken, the 
ICC can on more justified grounds continue its mission of ending impunity for high-level 
leaders. 
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I Introduction 
 
Classifying orchestrators of mass atrocity as accessories is entirely wrong – “almost 
backward, in fact”.1 The idea of individuals most responsible for crimes being convicted 
accomplices is untenable:2  
 
One especially evocative image drives the process. For many, the dilemma is that the 
application of everyday rules of criminal attribution leads to Hitler’s conviction as an 
accomplice to the Holocaust. 
 
International criminal law should seek to label high-level leaders as principals. The two 
dominant modes of principal liability used to convict high-level leaders are the doctrine of 
joint criminal enterprise (JCE) and the control over the crime theory (control theory). The 
International Criminal Court (ICC) has adopted the control theory in its approach to 
prosecuting high-level leaders, but this reliance on the control theory has been questioned 
by judges and scholars alike.3 What are the most appropriate steps for the ICC to take in 
its future prosecutions?  
 
The following paper seeks to answer this by examining the elements of JCE and the control 
theory. Part II begins by identifying the task of international criminal law and the qualities 
that any theory inculpating high-level leaders should have. Parts III and IV identify the 
utility of and problems with JCE and the control theory respectively. Part V is future-
focussed and aims to identify feasible steps that the ICC could take in its jurisprudence. 
International criminal law still requires a coherent basis for attributing responsibility.4 
 
                                                 
1  Mark Osiel Making Sense of Mass Atrocity (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009) at 85. 
2  James Stewart “The End of ‘Modes of Liability’ for International Crimes” (2012) 25 Leiden Journal 
of International Law 165 at 167. 
3  See Prosecutor v Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Concurring Opinion of Judge Christine Van den 
Wyngaert) ICC Trial Chamber II, ICC-01/04-02/12, 18 December 2012 at [5]; Prosecutor v Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo (Separate Opinion of Judge Fulford) ICC Trial Chamber I ICC-01/04-01/06, 14 
March 2012 at [6]; Marina Aksenova “The Modes of Liability at the ICC: The Labels that Don’t 
Always Stick” (2015) 15 International Criminal Law Review 629 at 630; and Gerhard Werle 
“Individual Criminal Responsibility in Article 25 of the ICC Statute” (2007) 5 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 953 at 959. 
4  Neha Jain Perpetrators and Accessories in International Criminal Law: Individual Modes of 
Responsibility for Collective Crimes (Hart Publishing, Oregon, 2014) at 9. 
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II Combatting Impunity 
 
Impunity undermines the purpose of international criminal law. Impunity is a failure to 
investigate, prosecute, and charge individuals guilty of serious violations of law. This 
undermines the rights of victims, weakens state institutions, and even degrades human 
values.5 For these reasons, international criminal law seeks to hold individuals responsible 
for mass atrocity. Domestic courts are primarily charged with prosecuting such 
individuals.6 International judicial bodies may, however, prosecute individuals where 
domestic courts cannot.7 The development of international judicial bodies has increased 
international law’s relative ability to respond to and prosecute serious violations of law.8 
This paper narrows its focus to two of these bodies: the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the ICC.  
A Prosecuting Individuals Who Are “Most Responsible” 
 
The ICTY focuses on prosecuting “the most senior leaders suspected of being most 
responsible for crimes committed within the jurisdiction of [the ICTY]”.9 Similarly, the 
ICC concentrates its indictments on “those who bear the greatest responsibility for crimes”. 
Both the ICTY and the ICC seek to combat the impunity of a particular type of defendant: 
those most responsible for mass atrocity. This begs the question: which individuals in any 
instance of mass atrocity are those most responsible? What type of defendant should the 
prosecutorial policy of an international judicial body concern itself with? 
1 High-level leaders 
 
                                                 
5  Brussels Group for International Justice “Brussels Principles Against Impunity and For International 
Justice” (paper presented to the Fight Against Impunity: Stakes and Perspectives, March 2002). 
6  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 2187 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 17 July 1998, 
entered into force 1 July 2002), preamble [Rome Statute]. 
7  Markus Benzing “The Complementarity Regime of the International Criminal Court: International 
Criminal Justice between State Sovereignty and the Fight against Impunity” (2003) 7 Max Planck 
Yearbook of United Nations 591 at 599. 
8  See Payam Akhavan “Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future 
Atrocities?” (2001) 95 American Journal of International Law 7 at 31; and Antonio Cassese “The 
Role of Internationalised Courts and Tribunals in the Fight Against International Criminality” in 
Cesare Romano, Andre Nollkaemper and Jann Kleffner Internationalised Criminal Courts and 
Tribunals (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004) at 3. 
9  International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) SC Res 1534, S/Res/1534 (2004) at 5. 
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The answer of the ICTY and the ICC is that leaders who occupy the upper echelons of 
power are those most responsible. The ICC focuses on prosecuting “those who bear the 
greatest responsibility, such as leaders of the State or organisation allegedly responsible for 
those crimes”.10 One reason for this is that whilst one physical perpetrator can cause 
considerable harm, an influential leader can cause thousands of physical perpetrators to do 
far greater harm.11 The position of responsibility that an individual occupies indicates their 
level of responsibility. A former ICTY Prosecutor identified that individuals most 
responsible are generally the highest political, military, paramilitary or civilian leaders in 
the State atrocities were committed in.12 High-level leaders may command military units, 
rebel groups operating outside the control of a government, or other groups acting under a 
policy.13 To this extent, high-level leaders are those “most responsible” through the power 
they exert over others.  
 
Prosecuting leaders as opposed to physical perpetrators is also more practical. Mass 
atrocity cannot be committed without the participation of a large number of ordinary 
people.14 In cases of large-scale violence, ordinary citizens may comply with or submit to 
brutality.15 Not all perpetrators of serious violations of law can be tried at international 
tribunals. The ICC Prosecutor has stated that it is not feasible to bring charges against all 
apparent perpetrators.16 By way of example, it is estimated that 200,000 people participated 
in the perpetration of the Rwandan genocide.17 This does not mean that less important or 
low-level perpetrators should enjoy impunity. Instead, low-level perpetrators should be 
                                                 
10  Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor International Criminal Court ICC-
OTP-2003, September 2003 at 7. 
11  Jo Stigen The Relationship between the International Criminal Court and National Jurisdictions: 
The Principle of Complementarity (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Boston, 2008) at 370. 
12  Carla Del Ponte “Prosecuting the Individuals Bearing the Highest Level of Responsibility” (2004) 
2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 516 at 517. 
13  Attila Bogdan “Individual Criminal Responsibility in the Execution of a ‘Joint Criminal Enterprise’ 
in the Jurisprudence of the ad hoc International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia” (2006) 6 
International Criminal Law Review 63 at 64.  
14  Jain, above n 4, at 8.  
15  Laurel Fletcher “From Indifference to Engagement: Bystanders and International Criminal Justice” 
(2005) 26 Michigan Journal of International Law 1013 at 1026. 
16  Informal Meeting of Legal Advisors of Ministries of Foreign Affairs (Statement by Luis Moreno-
Ocampo) ICC Office of the Prosecutor, 24 October 2005 at 5. 
17  Scott Straus “How Many Perpetrators Were There in the Rwandan Genocide? An Estimate” (2006) 
6 Journal of Genocidal Research 85 at 95. 
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transferred to and charged by domestic courts.18 For the ICTY and the ICC, the foremost 
concern is the basis on which the actions of low-level perpetrators can be attributed to a 
high-level leader.19 
2 Three examples of mass atrocity 
 
Large-scale and serious violations of international humanitarian law can occur in a number 
of ways. The “most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole”20 
inevitably involve collective criminality.21 Three examples of mass atrocity are outlined 
below. These three examples show that high-level leaders may be remote from a crime 
scene, high-level leaders may smokescreen their actions, and high-level leaders may need 
to collaborate in order to organise the perpetration of serious crimes.22  
 
The genocide committed in Srebrenica in July 1995 (Srebrenica genocide) is an example 
of mass atrocity committed with the assistance of a high-level leader remote from the 
crime. In the Srebrenica genocide, over 25,000 Bosnian Muslims were forcibly transferred 
out of Srebrenica in pursuit of a common plan.23 Subsequently, between 7,000 and 8,000 
Bosnian Muslims were executed.24 These executions were not a part of the commonly 
agreed plan to forcibly transfer civilians, but were a natural and foreseeable consequence 
of the common plan.25 Radislav Krstic, was the Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander of 
the Drina Corps.26 There was insufficient evidence to show that Radislav Krstic was 
present at the execution sites: instead, Radislav Krstic was engaged in other military 
activities.27 Nevertheless, a phone conversation between Radislav Krstic and a subordinate 
demonstrated that Radislav Krstic knew that executions were taking place and that Radislav 
                                                 
18  Letter dated 16 November 2015 from the President of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution 
of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, addressed to the President of the Security Council 
SC Res 874, S/Res/874 (2015) at 43. 
19  Osiel, above n 1, at 16. 
20  Rome Statute, preamble. 
21  Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges), above n 3, at [501]. 
22  Jens Ohlin, Elies van Sliedregt and Thomas Weigend “Assessing the Control Theory” (2013) 26 
Leiden Journal of International Law 725 at 735. 
23  Prosecutor v Radislav Krstic (Judgment) ICTY Trial Chamber IT-98-33-T, 2 August 2001 at [615]. 
24  At [720]. 
25  At [616]. 
26  At [298]. 
27  At [377] and [378]. 
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Krstic undertook to assist the subordinate in obtaining additional men to carry out the 
executions.28 Radislav Krstic contributed to the crime by identifying a particular group of 
additional men that could be used, and by undertaking to send these men to the site of the 
executions.29 High-level leaders who contribute to a crime may be remote from the physical 
commission of that crime.30 To this extent, high-level leaders may provide assistance from 
afar without physically perpetrating crimes.31  
 
Argentina’s dirty war is an example of mass atrocity committed in an arbitrary and 
spontaneous manner.32 During Argentina’s dirty war, at least 15,000 people were 
murdered. Mark Osiel notes that a recurring theme of this war was that high-level leaders 
suppressed the political and social activities of citizens.33 In addition, some high-level 
leaders deliberately planned arbitrary actions in order to smokescreen their plans.34 
Argentina’s dirty war shows that high-level leaders may employ a deliberate policy of 
spontaneity. Another characteristic of this war was that senior officers and junior officers 
alike were involved in mass murder. These junior officers had a considerable degree of 
autonomy in their actions.35 Argentina’s dirty war is an apt example of mass atrocity where 
some senior officers had control over their subordinates whereas others did not. 
 
Crimes committed by high-level leaders may require collaboration. As a result, a high-level 
leader may not exercise direct influence over a physical perpetrator nor share intent with 
them. The crimes committed by Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui are an 
excellent example of such combined leadership.36 Germain Katanga was the military leader 
of a Ngiti group known as the Force de Résistance Patriotique de l'Ituri (FRPI).37 Germain 
Katanga’s leadership was improvised and his army has an ill-defined hierarchical 
                                                 
28  At [385]. 
29  At [387]. 
30  Stefano Manacorda and Chantal Meloni “Indirect Perpetration versus Joint Criminal Enterprise: 
Concurring Approaches in the Practice of International Criminal Law?” (2011) 9 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 159 at 160. 
31  Elies van Sliedregt The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law (TMC Asser Press, The Hague, 2003) at 113. 
32  Osiel, above n 1, at 88. 
33  Mark Osiel “Constructing Subversion in Argentina’s Dirty War” (2001) 75 Representations 119 at 
125. 
34  At 126. 
35  Osiel, above n 1, at 102. 
36  Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges) ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I ICC-01/04-01/07, 30 September 2008 at [519]. 
37  At [6]. 
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structure.38 Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui was a colonel of a Lendu group known as the Front 
des Nationalistes et Intégrationnistes (FNI).39 Germain Katanga and Chui’s combined 
troops murdered the civilian population of Bogoro village, destroyed properties, and 
committed rapes and killings.40 The distinction between Ngitis and Lendus made it unlikely 
that combatants would comply with the orders of a leader who was not of the same 
ethnicity.41 Because of this, the atrocities committed could only have been perpetrated by 
the combined forces of the FRPI and the FNI.  
 
The ICC sought to hold Germain Katanga responsible for the combined conduct of FRPI 
and FNI forces. This was the case even though Germain Katanga himself did not exercise 
direct influence over a member of Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui’s forces nor share any intent 
with them.42 The charges against Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui were subsequently dropped, and 
Germain Katanga was later convicted of a lesser form of accessorial liability for all crimes 
excluding rape and sexual slavery.43 Nevertheless, this example of combined leadership 
shows that high-level leaders must sometimes collaborate in order to commit atrocity. As 
a result, high-level leaders may only indirectly influence the physical commission of crims. 
Together, these three examples give a practical basis to the following analysis of an 
appropriate mode of high-level leader liability. 
B An Appropriate Mode Of High-Level Leader Liability  
 
Both the ICTY and the ICC seek to prosecute high-level leaders. Part 1 will analyse 
whether leaders of the highest echelons should be labelled as principals of or accessories 
to a crime, concluding that such leaders must be labelled as principals. Part 2 will analyse 
whether command responsibility provides for an appropriate mode of liability, concluding 
that command responsibility does not adequately reflect the culpability of high-level 
                                                 
38  Prosecutor v Germain Katanga (Judgment) ICC Trial Chamber II ICC-01/04-01/07, 7 March 2014 
at [1420]; and Gerhard Werle and Boris Burghardt “Indirect Perpetration: A Perfect Fit for 
International Prosecution of Armchair Killers? Foreword” (2011) 9 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 85 at 89. 
39  Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges), above n 36, at [9]. 
40  At [568]. 
41  At [519]. 
42  Elinor Fry “International Criminal Court” (2013) 31 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 217 at 
220. 
43  Prosecutor v Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute) ICC Trial 
Chamber II ICC-01/04-02/12, 18 December 2012 at [197]; and Prosecutor v Germain Katanga 
(Judgment), above n 36, at [1693]. 
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leaders. Part 3 will identify the elements of the Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY Statute) and the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (Rome Statute).44 Part 4 will discuss the tension between 
individual criminal responsibility and convicting high-level leaders before Part 5 identifies 
the current status of principal liability for high-level leaders. 
1 Principals, not accessories 
 
There are a number of ways to attribute criminal responsibility to a high-level leader. An 
argument can be made that the exact label attached to an accused is irrelevant so long as 
defendants are held accountable and punished equally.45 In this vein, Judge Van den 
Wyngaert rejects the proposition that there is an inherent difference in guilt or 
blameworthiness between principals and accessories. Her Excellency, in a Concurring 
Opinion in Prosecutor v Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Judgment), held that there is no inherent 
difference in blameworthiness between abetting a crime and committing a crime.46 Her 
Excellency reasoned that the blameworthiness of a defendant depends on the factual 
circumstances of a case as opposed to abstract legal categories. Her Excellency held:47 
  
I fail to see an inherent difference in blameworthiness between aiding and abetting and 
committing a crime. I do not believe that the foot soldier who participated in a mass 
killing (Article 25(3)(a)) is necessarily more blameworthy than the army general who 
aided and abetted the same killing (Article 25(3)(c)). 
 
Judge Van den Wyngaert’s argument ignores a number of important considerations. 
International judicial bodies concentrate their prosecutions on high-level leaders as 
opposed to the physical perpetrators of mass atrocity.48 The situation where a foot soldier 
is convicted and held by virtue of principal status more blameworthy than an army general 
is in the practice of international tribunals unlikely. More importantly, an army general 
who assists in a same killing could, depending on the factual circumstances of the case, 
                                                 
44  Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia SC Res 827, S/Res/827 
(1993), art 7(1); and Rome Statute, art 25(3)(a). 
45  Jain, above n 4, at 6. 
46  Prosecutor v Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Concurring Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert), 
above n 3, at [24]. 
47  At [24]. 
48  Informal Meeting of Legal Advisors of Ministries of Foreign Affairs (Statement by Luis Moreno-
Ocampo), above n 16, at 5. 
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either come under the ambit of principal liability49 or be brought under the doctrine of 
command responsibility.50  
 
Some scholars argue that labels are unnecessary because the gravity of a crime can be taken 
into account at the sentencing stage.51 The Rome Statute, however, does not provide for 
sentences based on the sub-article of art 25(3) that a defendant is convicted under. To this 
extent, the only basis for differences in sentencing is a judge’s comprehension of the factual 
circumstances of the case.52 A court cannot on Monday convict a defendant of aiding and 
abetting and on Tuesday convict another defendant of perpetration on substantively the 
same, or largely similar, facts.53 To tell the latter defendant that it makes no difference 
whether they are convicted as a perpetrator or an accessory undermines the very existence 
of labelling. 
 
A more sophisticated proposition is suggested by Neha Jain.54 Neha Jain argues that 
statements of criminal responsibility fulfil a critical expressive function. Criminal 
responsibility fulfils this essential communicative function only if the status of the 
defendant in relation to a crime is accurately expressed.55 This communicative function is 
more important in international than domestic courts given the power of international 
tribunals to create a historical record of wrongdoing and to advance a sense of 
accountability for flagrant human rights violations.56 In addition, clearly communicating a 
defendant’s level of responsibility may help to reduce the likelihood of future violence in 
international law.57 By clearly labelling a mastermind of a crime as a principal, the law 
communicates to victims and to the international community who the ‘real culprit’ is.58 
                                                 
49  Rome Statute, art 25(3)(a). 
50  Rome Statute, art 28. 
51  Stewart, above n 2, at 70; and Prosecutor v Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Concurring Opinion of Judge 
Christine Van den Wyngaert), above n 3, at [26]. 
52  Olena Kucher and Alesky Petrenko “International Criminal Responsibility After Katanga: Old 
Challenges, New Solutions” (2015) 3 Russian Law Journal 143 at 152. 
53  Ohlin, Van Sliedregt and Weigend, above n 22, at 729. 
54  Jain, above n 4, at 6. 
55  At 7. 
56  Mirjan Damaska “What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?” (2008) 83 Chicago Kent Law 
Review 329 at 330. 
57  Alison Danner and Jenny Martinez “Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command 
Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law” (2004) 93 California Law 
Review 75 at 93. 
58  Elies van Sliedregt Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Law (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2012) at 74. 
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In the jurisprudence of international criminal courts, accessories are considered less 
blameworthy or responsible than perpetrators. ICTY sentencing practice shows that aiding 
and abetting are considered less blameworthy than direct perpetration.59 By way of 
example, in Prosecutor v Mile Mrksic Veselin Sljivancanin (Judgment) the ICTY Appeals 
Chamber held that aiding and abetting are considered a “lower form” of liability than 
perpetrating a criminal enterprise.60 In a similar manner, the ICC’s Trial Chamber has 
explicitly affirmed the importance of principal liability’s capacity to express a defendant’s 
responsibility. In Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dylio (Judgment), the ICC held that 
principal liability has the “capacity to express the blameworthiness of those persons who 
are most responsible for the most serious crimes of international concern”.61 Principal 
liability is consistent with international criminal law’s fight against impunity because it can 
label who is ‘most responsible’ for mass atrocity.  
2 Command responsibility 
 
Command responsibility (or superior liability) is a form of liability for omission. Command 
responsibility, despite being structurally appropriate to inculpate military62 and civilian63 
leaders, does not adequately reflect the involvement of senior leaders in crime.64 In ad hoc 
tribunals such as the ICTY, command responsibility is treated as an alternate, or fall-back, 
form of liability.65 In a similar manner, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo (Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) held that command 
responsibility and liability under art 25(3)(a) are different forms of criminal 
                                                 
59  See Prosecutor v Mitar Vasiljevic (Judgment) ICTY Appeals Chamber IT-98-32-A, 25 February 
2004 at [812]; Prosecutor v Blagoje Simic (Judgment) ICTY Appeals Chamber IT-95-9-A, 28 
November 2006 at [265]; and Barbora Hola “International Sentencing Facts and Figures: Sentencing 
Practice at the ICTY and the ICTR” (2011) 9 Journal of International Criminal Justice 411 at 417.  
60  Prosecutor v Mile Mrksic Veselin Sljivancanin (Judgment) ICTY Appeals Chamber IT-95-13/1-A, 
5 March 2009 at [407]. 
61  Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Judgment) ICC Trial Chamber I ICC-01/04-01/06, 14 March 
2012 at [999]. 
62  Rome Statute, art 28(a). 
63  Article 28(b). 
64  Manacorda and Meloni, above n 30, at 161. 
65  See Kai Ambos Treastie on International Criminal Law, Volume 1: Foundations and General Part 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013) at 149. 
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responsibility.66 The Pre-Trial Chamber held that an assessment of art 28 command 
responsibility is a secondary assessment to art 25(3)(a) principal liability.67 A defendant 
who takes steps in committing a crime is likely to be charged under art 25(3)(a) instead of 
art 28.68 In a similar manner, the Pre-Trial Chamber explicitly stated that commission of a 
crime under art 25(3)(a) is distinguished from “the responsibility of superiors under article 
28 of the [Rome] Statute and any other forms of accessory, as opposed to principal, 
liability”.69 
 
Some scholars note that the sentences associated with command responsibility are 
disproportionately short or lenient.70 Others argue that successful prosecutions under 
charges of command responsibility are challenging.71 By way of example, the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber overturned the guilty conviction under command responsibility of two 
military leaders, despite the fact that the military leaders were aware that their troops would 
deport villages and commit murders in four areas.72 Command responsibility is outside the 
scope of this paper as it is a form of liability for omission, therefore failing to sufficiently 
reflect the involvement of high-level leaders in crime.73 
                                                 
66  Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome 
Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo) ICC Pre-Trial 
Chamber II ICC-01/05-01/08, 15 June 2009 at [405]. 
67  At [402] and [403]; and Kate Neilson “Ending Impunity: Bringing Superiors of Private Military and 
Security Company Personnel to Justice” (2011) 9 New Zealand Yearbook of International Law 121 
at 125.  
68  Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome 
Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo), above n 66, at [342]; 
and Chantal Meloni “Command Responsibility, Joint Commission and ‘Control Over The Crime’ 
Approach in the First ICC Jurisprudence” in Triestino Mariniello The International Criminal Court 
in Search of Its Purpose and Identity (Routledge, New York, 2015) at 50. 
69  Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Decision on the Confirmation of Charges) ICC Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, ICC-01/04-01/06, 29 January 2007 at [320]. 
70  Christine Bishai “Superior Responsibility, Inferior Sentencing: Sentencing Practice at the 
International Criminal Tribunals” (2013) 11 Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 
83 at 84; and Osiel, above n 1, at 21. 
71  Mark Harmon and Fergal Gaynor “The Sentencing Practice of the International Criminal Tribunals: 
Ordinary Sentences for Extraordinary Crimes” (2007) 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 
683 at 685. 
72  Prosecutor v Ante Gotovina, and Mladen Markac (Judgment) ICTY Appeals Chamber IT-06-90-A, 
16 November 2012 at [137]. 
73  Manacorda and Meloni, above n 30, at 161. 
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3 The ICTY Statute and the Rome Statute 
 
As stated above, leaders in the highest echelons of power should be labelled as principals, 
and not as accessories or guilty by omission. This section will analyse whether the ICTY 
Statute and the Rome Statute are consistent with this proposition. Do these statutes allow 
high-level leaders to be convicted as principals? The ICTY Statute is less detailed than the 
Rome Statute. Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute states that “a person who planned, 
instigated, ordered, committed, or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation 
or execution of a crime” shall be individually responsible for the crime.74 Article 7(1) of 
the ICTY Statute codifies the principle of personal culpability.75 Article 7(1) of the ICTY 
Statute has nevertheless been interpreted to convict high-level leaders, under the doctrine 
of JCE, as principals. This interpretation of the sparse wording in art 7(1) is controversial.76 
The ICTY Statute has successfully, though not without an expansive reading of art 7(1), 
been used to convict high-level leaders as perpetrators.  
 
Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute details various modes of criminal responsibility. The 
Rome Statute is relatively more precise in its codification of modes of liability than the 
ICTY Statute.77 The Rome Statute is unique in international law as it recognises three types 
of perpetration: direct perpetration, joint perpetration, and indirect perpetration.78 Article 
25(3)(a) provides that a person shall be criminally responsible for a crime within the ICC’s 
jurisdiction if that person:79 
 
“3(a). Commits a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or through 
another person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible.” 
 
                                                 
74  Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia SC Res 827, S/Res/827 
(1993), art 7(1). 
75  Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic (Judgment) ICTY Appeals Chamber IT-94-1-A, 15 July 1999 at [186]. 
76  See Jens Ohlin “Three Conceptual Problems with the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise” (2007) 
5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 69 at 76; Sofia Lord “Joint Criminal Enterprise and the 
International Criminal Court” (LLB dissertation, Stockholm University, 2013) at 12; Alexander 
Zahar and Goran Sluiter International Criminal Law: A Critical Introduction (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2008) at 223; and Prosecutor v Milan Martic (Separate Opinion of Judge Schomburg 
on the Individual Criminal Responsibility of Milan Martic) ICTY Appeals Chamber IT-95-11-A, 8 
October 2008 at [4]. 
77  Robert Cryer and others An Introduction to International Criminal Law (3rd ed, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2015) at 355. 
78  Van Sliedregt, above n 58, at 74. 
79  Rome Statute, art 25(3)(a). 
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Nevertheless, the Rome Statute does not explicitly provide the elements of principal 
liability for high-level leaders.80 In this respect, art 25(3)(a) is “maddeningly vague”.81 The 
constituent elements of “jointly with another” (co-perpetration) or “through another 
person” (indirect perpetration) are unspecified: the Statute does not specify the substantive 
content of these modes of perpetration. Whilst an in-depth analysis of the origins of the 
ICC is outside the scope of the present paper, the drafting history of the Rome Statute may 
shed light on art 25(3). 
 
(a) The drafting history of art 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute 
 
The drafting history of the Rome Statute suggests no singular doctrine underlying art 
25(3)’s modes of perpetration.82 Instead, the drafting history of art 25(3)(a) of the Rome 
Statute is based upon a diverse range of sources from the legal traditions of several 
nations.83 The drafting of art 25(3) was a difficult process, yet eventually near-consensus 
was reached.84 Article 25(3) essentially provides judges with a variety of modes of 
participation to choose from.85 In addition to the influence of national legal systems, art 
25(3)(d) of the Statute draws upon art 2(3) of the International Convention on the 
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings.86 Article 25’s multiple origins reflect the wishes of 
State parties to find a compromise between different national traditions.87 To this extent, 
art 25(3) is based on a variety of legal traditions. 
 
Despite being based on a variety of legal traditions, one version of the draft text provides 
some insight into art 25(3)(a). For some time, a version of art 25(3)(a) stated: “commits 
such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another, or through a person who is not 
                                                 
80  Prosecutor v Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Concurring Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert), 
above n 3, at [14]. 
81  Kevin Heller “Lubanga Decision Roundtable: More on Co-Perpetration” Opinio Juris (16 March 
2012) at 1. 
82   Van Sliedregt, above n 58, at 86. 
83  Per Saland “International Criminal Law Principles” in Roy Lee (ed) The International Criminal 
Court, The Making of the Rome Statute: Issues, Negotiations and Results” (Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, 1999) at 198. 
84  Ohlin, Van Sliedregt and Weigend, above n 22, at 744. 
85  Saland, above n 83, at 198. 
86  International Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings A/52/653 (opened for signature 
12 January 1998, entered into force 23 May 2001), art 2(3).  
87   Prosecutor v Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Concurring Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert), 
above n 3, at [13]. 
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criminally responsible”.88 The phrase “through another person who is not criminally 
responsible” was later replaced with “through another person, regardless of whether that 
other person is criminally responsible”.89 Elies van Sliedregt notes that this is reminiscent 
of Claus Roxin’s control theory.90 Beyond this, the drafting history suggests no single legal 
tradition behind art 25(3)(a). 
 
(b) The phrasing of art 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute 
 
Article 25(3)(a)’s strict wording is inconsistent with a naturalistic (or derivative) approach 
to liability but consistent with a normative approach to liability. A naturalistic approach to 
liability is defined as an approach of cause and effect.91 A naturalistic approach holds that 
a principal immediately causes a crime to happen, and an accessory contributes to the 
commission of that crime. A naturalistic approach generally means that a principal must 
have physically perpetrated a crime.92 Conversely, a normative approach to liability is 
defined as approach of responsibility.93 A normative approach holds that a principal is the 
person who is most responsible for a crime.94 Elies van Sliedregt states that in this sense, a 
principal can have a decisive influence on a crime without necessarily physically 
perpetrating it.95 As stated earlier, art 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute codifies intellectual 
perpetration as a mode of principal liability. Article 25(3)(a) is inconsistent with a 
naturalistic approach to liability.  
 
Article 25(3)(a) is consistent with a normative approach to liability. The ICC’s preference 
for a normative approach to art 25(3) can be seen in the cases of Prosecutor v Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo (Decision on the Confirmation of Charges) (Lubanga Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges)96 and Prosecutor v Katanga (Judgment).97 International criminal 
                                                 
88  Van Sliedregt, above n 58, at 95. 
89  Rome Statute, art 25(3)(a). 
90  Van Sliedregt, above n 58, at 95. 
91  Van Sliedregt, above n 58, at 71. 
92  See Jain, above n 4, at 106. 
93  Van Sliedregt, above n 58, at 71. 
94  Elies van Sliedregt “International Criminal Law” in Markus Dubber The Oxford Handbook of 
Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014) at 1157. 
95  Van Sliedregt, above n 58, at 72. 
96  Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Decision on the Confirmation of Charges), above n 69, at 
[330]. 
97  Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges), above n 36, at [506]. 
20 JOINT CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE AND THE CONTROL THEORY: HIGH-LEVEL LEADERS AS PRINCIPALS OF CRIME 
 
courts have adhered to a normative approach to labelling participants98 due to the value in 
making clear who the ‘real’ culprit of crime is.99 Article 25(3)(a) not only permits, but is 
consistent with, a normative approach that labels intellectual perpetrators as principals. 
 
A normative approach to liability also honours the principle of fair labelling. The principle 
of fair labelling states that a defendant’s role in a crime should be properly reflected in the 
mode of criminal responsibility they are liable under.100 If high-level leaders are labelled 
as accessories, this does not adequately reflect the role that the high-level leader played. A 
normative approach to liability is capable of labelling intellectual perpetrators as the person 
most responsible. This performs the crucial expressive function of international criminal 
law.101 In contrast, a naturalistic approach to liability labels intellectual perpetrators of 
crimes as accessories.  A naturalistic theory of participation fails to honour the principle of 
fair labelling.102 Given that the ICC recognises a normative approach to liability under art 
25(3), high-level leaders most responsible for crimes should be labelled as perpetrators.103 
4 Safeguarding the rights of defendants 
 
The search for an appropriate theory of high-level leadership should not obscure the rights 
of defendants. A legacy of the Nuremberg trials is the importance of individual criminal 
responsibility.104 The principle of individual criminal responsibility, otherwise known as 
personal culpability (nulla poena sine culpa), holds that a defendant cannot be held 
criminally responsible for crimes in which he has not personally engaged or in some way 
participated in.105 To this extent, as James Stewart notes, the Hitler-as-accomplice dilemma 
must be balanced with Adolf Eichmann’s appeal to unfairness.106 Adolf Eichmann, a Nazi 
military leader, stated: “I have the most profound conviction that I am being made to pay 
                                                 
98  See Gregory Townsend “Current Developments in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda” (2005) International Criminal Law Review 147 at 156; and Van Sliedregt, 
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21 JOINT CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE AND THE CONTROL THEORY: HIGH-LEVEL LEADERS AS PRINCIPALS OF CRIME 
 
here for the glass that others have broken”.107 In this sense, as undesirable as the Hitler-as-
accomplice dilemma is, a theory of participation should not make a defendant “pay” for 
acts they have not in some way brought about. A theory of participation must not 
substantiate Adolf Eichmann’s appeal to unfairness by attributing a high-level leader with 
crimes they did not contribute to. 
 
It is worth noting that a theory of high-level leadership stretches the bounds of individual 
criminal responsibility. Individual criminal responsibility holds that defendants cannot be 
held criminally responsible for crimes in which they have not personally engaged or in 
some way participated in. It is self-evident that a high-level leader does not physically 
perpetrate criminal acts. Yet a high-level leader may be temporally and geographically 
remote from the scene of a crime. A high-level leader may never meet the physical 
perpetrators of atrocity, instead merely orchestrating the climate in which atrocities take 
place. A high-level leader may go so far as to consciously plan arbitrary actions in order to 
smokescreen their culpability.108 None of these situations result in a less harm than a high-
level leader who is close to the scene of a crime and personally engaged with subordinates. 
The principle of individual criminal responsibility is stretched where a defendant is less 
connected to the commission of the crime. To this extent, individual criminal responsibility 
in international law is necessarily sui generis as it does not fit well with a traditional mode 
of liability.109  
 
International judicial bodies who prosecute high-level leaders must honour procedural 
justice. The ICTY has a wide power to create or amend its own Rules.110 The ICC has a 
more restricted framework. Article 21 of the Rome Statute limits the sources of law that 
the ICC can draw on.111 An example of an ICC procedural safeguard is the principle of in 
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dubio pro reo. Article 22 of the Rome Statute states that in the event of ambiguity, the 
Rome Statute shall be construed in favour of the defendant (the principle of in dubio pro 
reo).112 Part III will identify how JCE has been accused of unduly impacting upon a 
defendant’s right to a defence.  
 
At this stage, it is worth noting that the ICC seeks to uphold the due process rights of 
defendants. By way of example, despite the fact that Judge Fulford disagreed with the Pre-
Trial Chamber’s interpretation of art 25(3), His Excellency held that the case should 
proceed to the Trial Chamber on the basis of the law set out by the Pre-Trial Chamber 
thereby retaining a defendant’s right to be informed of the charges against them.113 Some 
authors note that the ICC may come close to breaching the legality principle in its 
interpretation of art 25(3)(d) accessorial liability.114 This paper, however, narrows its scope 
to art 25(3)(a) in order to evaluate the most appropriate elements of a theory of principal 
liability. This section concludes that individual criminal responsibility is sui generis in 
relation to a theory of participation and international tribunals should seek to safeguard the 
rights of defendants. 
5 The current status of a mode of principal liability for high-level leaders 
 
Two major modes of principal liability for high-level leaders exist in international law: the 
ICTY’s doctrine of JCE, and the ICC’s control theory. What is interesting is that neither 
the ICTY Statute nor the Rome Statute express the elements of a mode of perpetration for 
high-level leaders. Instead, judges have read meaning into art 7(1) of the ICTY Statute in 
order to convict high-level leaders under the doctrine of JCE. Similarly, art 25(3)(a) of 
Rome Statute has been interpreted to convict high-level leaders under the control theory. 
But what is the most appropriate mode of liability for future international prosecutions? 
Parts III and IV will analyse JCE and the control theory respectively as the two major 
modes of perpetrator liability used to convict high-level leaders in international law. 
 
III The Doctrine Of Joint Criminal Enterprise 
 
JCE is a doctrine created by the ICTY’s Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic 
(Judgment) (Tadic).115 The ICTY was created for the sole purpose of prosecuting crimes 
                                                 
112  Rome Statute, art 22(2). 
113  Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Separate Opinion of Judge Fulford), above n 3, at [20]. 
114  Kucher and Petrenko, above n 52, at 163. 
115  Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic (Judgment), above n 75, at [227]. 
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committed after 1 January 1991 in the former Yugoslavia. The UN Security Council passed 
Resolution 827 to establish the ICTY.116 The creation of JCE upholds the driving force 
behind Nuremberg prosecutions, being the need to devise an acceptable solution to 
prosecute individuals for mass atrocities.117 JCE liability is based on art 7(1) of the ICTY 
Statute. Article 7(1) states that a defendant will be “individually responsible” for a crime 
if that defendant planned, instigated, ordered, committed, or otherwise aided and abetted 
in the planning or execution of a crime.118 There is no explicit reference to liability for 
participation in a joint criminal enterprise in the ICTY Statute. JCE, the “darling of 
prosecutors”, is a wide-ranging doctrine that is appropriately capable of labelling high-
level leaders as perpetrators. JCE has nevertheless faced significant criticism over its 
inconsistent jurisprudence119 and allegations that the doctrine goes too far.120 
A Tadic 
 
In June of 1992, a group of armed men entered Jaskici, a village in Bosnia. This group of 
armed men attacked and killed five Bosnian Muslims. Witnesses identified Dusko Tadic 
as a member of this group of armed men. The witnesses could not, however, specifically 
link Dusko Tadic to the killings. Though Dusko Tadic was a member of the group and 
played a crucial role in the attack, the Trial Chamber was not satisfied that he physically 
perpetrated the killings. Factually, the killings were a foreseeable consequence of the 
group’s common plan or policy to ethnically cleanse the region of non-Serbians.121 On this 
basis, the Appeals Chamber overturned the Trial Chamber and held that Dusko Tadic was 
guilty under art 7(1) of these killings by way of a joint criminal enterprise. 
 
The Appeals Chamber firstly noted that the principle of personal culpability (nulla poena 
sine culpa) means that a defendant cannot be held criminally responsible for crimes in 
which he has not personally engaged or in some way participated in.122 The Trial Chamber, 
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after analysing the jurisprudence of military tribunals,123 held that collective criminality 
was firmly established in customary international law.124 This customary basis has been 
subject to rigorous academic critique.125 The ICTY subsequently enunciated three types of 
JCE: basic (JCE I),126 systematic (JCE II),127 and extended (JCE III).128  
1 Actus Reus 
 
The actus reus is materially the same for all three forms of JCE.129  These requirements are 
a “plurality of persons”;130 the existence of a “common plan” or purpose which involves 
the commission of a crime provided for in the ICTY Statute;131 and “participation of the 
accused in the common design”.132 The common plan need not be express, and its existence 
can be inferred from all the circumstances.133 Two elements that have proved controversial 
are whether the common plan can be fluid,134 and whether the accused’s participation in 
the common design must be “substantial”.135 JCE allows each member of the common 
purpose to be equally responsible, even if some members are not involved in the physical 
perpetration of the crime. 
1 Mens Rea 
 
The mens rea differs for all three forms of JCE.136 
 
(a) JCE I 
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For culpability under JCE I, the accused must share the intent to commit the relevant 
crime.137 The accused must voluntarily participate in the common design, and must intend 
the object of the common design.138 In addition, all participants must possess the same 
criminal intention but JCE members can use physical perpetrators who are not a part of the 
JCE.139 
 
Neha Jain illustrates JCE I with an example.140 A high ranking civilian leader and a military 
commander develop a common plan to ethnically cleanse a certain territory. These leaders 
order killings and torture, and implement these plans though unit leaders under their 
authority. The unit leaders then use civilians to commit crimes of murder and torture. The 
civilians are unaware of the full extent of the crimes planned nor the policy behind their 
commission. JCE I can hold the civilian leader, the military commander and the unit leaders 
liable for the crimes committed in execution of the common plan of ethnic cleansing. This 
is the case even though the physical crimes were committed by civilians who could not 
have known, intended, or foreseen that crimes were part of a plan of ethnic cleansing. 
 
(b) JCE II 
 
JCE II is specific to systematic, institutionalised systems of ill-treatment (such as 
concentration camps). For culpability under JCE II, the accused must have personal 
knowledge of the system of ill-treatment and an intent to further the system of ill-
treatment.141 In Prosecutor v Miroslav Kvocka (Judgment) (Kvocka), the Appeals Chamber 
held that an accused must have personal knowledge of the criminal nature of the system.142 
Personal knowledge of the system of ill-treatment can be inferred from circumstances.143 
Except in the instance of specific intent crimes, there is no requirement that the defendant 
intends to commit the crime they are charged with.144 This inference-based knowledge is 
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criticised on the basis that it reverses the burden of proof for intent and knowledge.145 In 
an institutionalised system of ill-treatment with “functional divisions of labour”, inferring 
knowledge of the full scale of crimes risks obscuring the different functions of individuals 
in such a system.146 In practice, JCE II is more narrowly applied than JCE I or JCE III due 
to its focus on institutionalised systems of ill-treatment. 
 
(c) JCE III 
 
JCE III essentially enables liability for crimes committed outside a common plan if these 
crimes were nonetheless a foreseeable consequence of such a plan. For culpability under 
JCE III, the accused must possess the intent to participate in the JCE and must intend to 
further the criminal purpose of the enterprise.147 In addition, if one or more members of the 
JCE (or a non-member of the JCE)148 commits crimes that go beyond the common purpose, 
the accused is responsible for these crimes if two requirements are satisfied: the additional 
crimes were a foreseeable consequence of the realization of the common plan, and the 
accused willingly took this risk.149  
 
This standard is also known as advertent recklessness (dolus eventualis).150 More than 
negligence is required. Although a defendant may not intend to bring about a certain result, 
that defendant must have been aware (and must nevertheless have willingly taken the risk) 
that the actions of the group were most likely to lead to that result.151 A defendant can be 
responsible for crimes outside the common purpose, even if they were unaware of their 
occurrence, if that defendant was aware that those crimes were a natural and foreseeable 
consequence of the common purpose.152 
  
                                                 
145  See Verena Haan “The Development of the Concept of Criminal Enterprise at the International 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia” (2005) 5 International Criminal Law Review 167 at 201; and 
Jain, above n 4, at 59. 
146  Elies van Sliedregt “Joint Criminal Enterprise as a Pathway to Convicting Individuals for Genocide” 
(2007) Journal of International Criminal Justice 5 at 188. 
147  Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic (Judgment), above n 75, at [228]. 
148  Prosecutor v Ljube Boskoski (Judgment) ICTY Trial Chamber II IT-04-82-T, 10 July 2008 at [397]. 
149  Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic (Judgment), above n 75, at [228]. 
150  At [219]. 
151  At [220]. 
152  Prosecutor v Radislav Krstic (Judgment) ICTY Appeals Chamber IT-98-33-A, 19 April 2004 at 
[150]. 
27 JOINT CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE AND THE CONTROL THEORY: HIGH-LEVEL LEADERS AS PRINCIPALS OF CRIME 
 
Neha Jain illustrates JCE III by way of a similar example.153 A high ranking civilian leader 
and a military commander develop a common plan to ethnically cleanse a certain territory. 
They order killings – but not torture – and implement this plan though unit leaders under 
their authority. A unit leader recruits a new group of civilians to help with the common 
plan. In the course of these deportations, these civilians commit not only killings but torture 
and rapes (additional crimes outside of the common purpose). JCE III can hold the civilian 
leader, the military commander, and the unit leaders liable for these additional crimes 
committed by civilians in execution of the common plan of ethnic cleansing. This is the 
case even if the crimes committed were outside the common purpose, so long as crimes 
were a foreseeable consequence of the common plan and the accused willingly took this 
risk. 
B From Small-Scale To Large-Scale Enterprises: The Wake of Tadic 
 
Ad hoc tribunals have subsequently applied the doctrine of JCE, including the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Rwanda (ICTR), the Special Court of Sierra Leone 
(SCSL), the East Timorese Special Panel for Serious Crimes (SPSC) and the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon (STL). It is worth noting, however, that the Extraordinary Chambers 
in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) has refused to apply JCE III due to its controversial 
nature.154 Whilst the ICTY initially applied JCE to small scale enterprises, JCE has 
subsequently been applied to large-scale enterprises in attempts to prosecute high-level 
leaders.155 JCE was first applied to a large-scale enterprise156 in the judgment of Prosecutor 
v Radoslav Brdjanin (Judgment).157 Essentially, the Appeals Chamber accepted an 
interlinked concept of JCE in order to convict Radoslav Brdjanin (the Vice-President of a 
political party) of crimes against humanity committed during the Bosnian war.  
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Applying JCE to a large-scale enterprise is controversial as JCE is based on cases involving 
small-scale enterprises158 such as the case of Prosecutor v D’Ottavio et al.159 In Prosecutor 
v D’Ottavio et al., armed civilians pursued two prisoners of war who had escaped from a 
concentration camp. One civilian shot at the prisoners of war without intending to kill, but 
one prisoner of war died as a result. Scholars argue that JCE applies well to small-scale 
cases such as Prosecutor v D’Ottavio et al, or to the example of a group of platoon members 
who commit torture with the intent of obtaining information where there are only a few 
members of a criminal enterprise.160 Mohamed Badar argues that on this basis, JCE cannot 
be applied to situations of large-scale or systematic criminality where thousands of 
members of a joint criminal enterprise may exist.161 Similarly, Hector Osalo alleges that 
the application of JCE to large-scale enterprises unacceptably extends criminal liability to 
low-level and mid-level superiors.162  
 
A number of arguments can be made against this conclusion. Firstly, the ICTY in Tadic 
explicitly acknowledged that JCE is compatible with large-scale enterprises. This was clear 
in the Appeals Chamber’s statement that JCE III could apply where a group’s common 
purpose was the forcible removal of individuals from a “town, village, or region”.163 The 
forcible removal of individuals from a region can require a huge number of physical 
perpetrators and a potentially large number of members of a common enterprise: as 
mentioned earlier, one example of forcible transfer of a population involved the movement 
of over 25,000 individuals from one region to another.164 JCE, as first articulated by the 
ICTY, anticipated both small and large-scale common enterprises.  
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Whilst Tadic cited cases of small-scale criminality as the basis of the doctrine of JCE, Tadic 
also cited the Einsatzgruppen case as a basis of JCE.165 The Appeals Chamber in a later 
judgment held that the Einstanzgruppen case is a “clear-cut large scale case” that involved 
a murder program to kill Poland’s elite.166 JCE is not exclusively based on small scale 
common enterprises. Finally, Hector Osalo’s argument that JCE unacceptably extends 
liability to low-level and mid-level perpetrators neglects two key considerations. The first 
is that international bodies and tribunals focus on prosecuting defendants who are most 
responsible.167 The second is that in order to be held liable under JCE, a defendant must 
still participate in some way (by assistance or contribution) to the commission of the 
common plan.168 High-level leaders in a large-scale criminal enterprise may be more 
remote from a crime, but in order to be liable these leaders must fulfil the actus reus 
requirements of JCE. Extending JCE to large-scale enterprises does not involve guilt by 
association because JCE liability is limited to defendants who contribute to a common 
plan.169 The better question is whether this standard of contribution to a common plan is 
appropriate. The ICC’s analogous standard of an essential contribution is analysed in Part 
IV. 
C Plagued By Problems? 
1 Procedural justice 
 
Significant procedural justice issues have plagued the ICTY’s jurisprudence. An accused 
can be convicted under JCE even if an indictment does not explicitly refer to JCE.170 The 
net result is that JCE is frequently resorted to in the ICTY as a means of assigning liability 
to a defendant.171 A subsidiary result is that defendants may not have sufficient opportunity 
to defend themselves under a charge of JCE.172 Guilia Bigi notes that it is easier to hold a 
defendant liable for JCE than it is to hold a defendant liable for other forms of liability 
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provided for in the ICTY Statute.173 Failure to identify the precise mode of participation is 
not fatal to a conviction under JCE.174 Another critique of JCE is that the prosecution does 
not need to prove the mens rea of all members of the joint criminal enterprise. On this 
basis, JCE is criticised for expanding liability beyond an appropriate ground of 
culpability.175 A coherent theory of participation in international law should seek to 
safeguard the rights of defendants. JCE, however, significantly breaches principles of 
fairness to defendants and due process. 
 
Guila Bigi argues that JCE’s inconsistent jurisprudence is a symptom of a poorly 
articulated doctrine.176 By way of example, an issue specific to JCE III is the defendant’s 
level of knowledge of additional crimes committed outside of the common purpose. In 
Prosecutor v Radoslav Brdjanin (Judgment) (Brdjanin), the Trial Chamber held that a 
defendant must only have been aware that an additional crime committed was a ‘possible’ 
consequence of the common plan.177 Yet according to both the Trial and Appeals Chambers 
in Prosecutor v Radislav Krstic (Judgment) (Krstic), a defendant must have been aware 
that additional crimes committed were an ‘inevitable’ consequence of the common plan.178 
A third standard is enunciated in Prosecutor v Kvocka (Judgment) (Kvocka), where the 
Appeals Chamber held that a defendant must have been aware that the crimes were a 
‘natural and foreseeable consequence’ of a common plan.179 Such confusion is an excellent 
example of the inconsistency that has plagued the ICTY.  
 
These inconsistencies do not justify the conclusion that JCE is fundamentally flawed. 
Contradictions in the ICTY’s jurisprudence could equally reflect the difficulty of 
enunciating any theory of participation rather than the flawed nature of JCE itself. For 
example, the ICC’s control theory is not immune from inconsistent jurisprudence180 such 
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as vagueness of the control criterion181 and criticism of its rigidity.182  In addition, theories 
of participation in domestic criminal law have a “long history” of internal inconsistency 
making it unsurprising that inconsistencies exist in international theories of participation 
such as JCE.183 In applying any theory of participation, it is always possible that different 
courts come to inconsistent results.184 Such inconsistencies may be common to theories of 
participation as opposed to reflective of JCE’s shortcomings. Inconsistent jurisprudence 
does not in itself render JCE unusable.  
2 ‘Out of control’ 
 
Some scholars argue that JCE has lost touch with the “restraining force” of the common 
law.185 On one hand, domestic principles have long influenced international law186 and can 
serve a restraining function.187 On the other hand, JCE III can inculpate defendants for 
crimes committed outside a common plan if these crimes were nonetheless a foreseeable 
consequence of such a plan, and a defendant willingly took this risk.188 This standard of 
dolus eventualis has been heavily criticised on the basis that it can convict a defendant 
using a very low mens rea threshold.189 Steven Powles argues that a defendant cannot be 
liable as a perpetrator of a crime when that defendant did not intend to commit that crime 
and may not have been aware that such a crime had actually been committed.190 
 
Critics of JCE III emphasise the principle of individual criminal responsibility, arguing that 
high-level leaders cannot be criminally responsible for acts which they have only distantly 
personally engaged or participated in.191 The principle of individual criminal responsibility 
is stronger in JCE I and weaker in JCE III. This is because a high-level leader can only be 
convicted under JCE I if they intend to commit a relevant crime.192 In contrast, a high-level 
leader can be convicted under JCE III if they only intend to commit a common enterprise 
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and additional crimes subsequently occur that were a foreseeable consequence.193 To this 
extent, JCE III can convict a defendant based on a lower level of personal culpability 
compared to other forms of participation. 
 
In a similar vein, however, scholars have criticised command responsibility on the basis 
that it does not adequately reflect a defendant’s personal culpability.194 James Stewart 
argues that command responsibility is insensitive to a defendant’s personal culpability.195 
In a similar manner, Mirjan Damaska argues that command responsibility codified in the 
Rome Statute is like a type of club used to administer rough justice.196 To this extent, 
command responsibility is criticised for being “dependent on prosecutorial integrity to 
safeguard potentially indiscriminate severity”.197 Both JCE and command responsibility 
have been criticised as unfairly attributing personal culpability to a defendant. The 
principle of nulla poena sine culpa may, therefore, need to be stretched to some degree if 
high-level leaders are to be inculpated. As mentioned above, the principle of personal 
culpability is to an extent incompatible with the function of individual criminal 
responsibility in international law.198  
 
It is unclear whether additional crimes committed outside the common purpose must be 
objectively and subjectively foreseeable. Neha Jain argues that objective foreseeability is 
too low a standard on the basis that foreseeability of another’s actions is difficult in the 
sheer scale of atrocities committed in armed conflict.199 Antonio Cassese, however, argued 
that objective foreseeability is sufficient as public policy considerations – namely 
protecting society against criminals who form illegal common enterprises – justify the wide 
ambit of JCE III.200 On balance, Cassese’s argument has more practical utility. To prevent 
the conviction of a party to a joint criminal enterprise on the basis that the accused could 
not (even objectively) foresee that subsidiary crimes may be committed along the way 
risks, in the context of complex and spontaneous international crimes, enabling the too-
frequent exculpation of architects of atrocity. In addition, JCE III still requires a defendant 
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to make a contribution to the common plan. A standard of objective foreseeability does not 
mean that JCE III becomes too powerful. On this basis, this paper will analyse the control 
theory from the perspective that procedural criticisms of JCE are well founded, but JCE’s 
wide ambit and ability to attribute responsibility to a leader are not necessarily unjustified. 
3 The status of JCE 
 
Part III has analysed JCE, one of the two dominant modes of perpetrator liability used to 
convict high-level leaders in international law. The three types of JCE enunciated in Tadic 
have been applied beyond small-scale cases in order to convict leaders in large-scale 
enterprises. Critics of JCE allege that its wide ambit increases the risk that a high-level 
leader is found guilty by mere association. Opponents of this proposition argue that JCE’s 
scope is restricted because a high-level leader must still have committed the actus reus by 
way of assistance in or contribution to a common purpose.201 Significant procedural justice 
issues and allegations that JCE is out of control have tarnished this doctrine. JCE is still 
used by the ICTY as well as ad hoc Tribunals, but the ICC has chosen not to adopt JCE 
(Part IV). As one of the two dominant modes of principal liability, JCE can offer significant 
insight into the most appropriate steps for the ICC in its future prosecutions (Part V). 
 
IV Sweeping Receptivity: The Control Theory 
 
The ICC has adopted the control theory as a means to prosecute high-level leaders as 
principals. The control theory applies to art 25(3) of the Rome Statute. The ICC essentially 
dethroned JCE in favour of the control theory.202 In refusing to apply JCE, one scholar 
notes that the ICC was initially associated with an analytically rigorous approach to 
international criminal law.203 Contrary to international law’s “sweeping receptivity” to the 
control theory,204 it is not a panacea to JCE’s ills. Some scholars argue that the control 
theory is based on “ambiguities and wrongful assumptions”.205 The source of the ICC’s 
reliance on the control theory, as well as its scope, have been criticized.206 Part A will 
identify the jurisdiction of the ICC. Part B will identify the elements of principal liability 
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under art 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute. Part C will analyse how and why the ICC distanced 
itself from JCE. Part D will evaluate criticisms of the control theory in order for Part V to 
identify the most appropriate steps for the ICC in its future prosecutions. 
A The International Criminal Court 
 
The ICC is governed by the Rome Statute. The ICC came into existence on 1 July 2002.207 
The ICC’s jurisdiction is limited to the prosecution of particular crimes: genocide,208 
crimes against humanity,209 war crimes,210 and (pending adoption in 2017) the crime of 
aggression.211 The ICC may only prosecute defendants who are nationals of State Parties 
to the Rome Statute212 unless a non-State Party accepts the exercise of jurisdiction for a 
particular crime.213 Alternatively, the ICC can prosecute defendants for crimes committed 
within the boundaries of a State Party214 or a consenting non-State Party.215 The ICC’s 
jurisdiction is further limited to crimes committed after 1 July 2002.216 As mentioned 
earlier, the ICC focuses on prosecuting defendants who bear the greatest responsibility for 
crimes such as leaders of the State or organisation allegedly responsible for those crimes.217 
 
The ICC has moved in a different direction to the ICTY’s jurisprudence. Despite the 
parallels that exist between all three forms of JCE and art 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute218 
the Pre-Trial Chamber held that art 25(3)(b), (c) and (d) of the Statute provide for 
accessory, not principal, liability.219 Leaders in the highest echelons of power should be 
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labelled as perpetrators, not accessories, of crimes. The Pre-Trial Chamber in the 
Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Decision on the Confirmation of Charges) (Lubanga 
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges) held that art 25(3)(a) is mode of principal 
liability that convicts defendants under the control theory.220 Accordingly, the following 
analysis focuses on the Pre-Trial Chamber’s interpretation of art 25(3)(a) in the Lubanga 
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges. 
B Lubanga 
 
Thomas Lubanga was the leader of a military wing of a political group, the Union of 
Congolese Patriots (UPC), in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The Union of 
Congolese Patriots agreed upon a common plan and acted together to build an army for the 
purpose of establishing and maintaining political and military control over Ituri.221 In the 
ordinary course of events, young boys and girls under the age of 15 were conscripted and 
enlisted for the purpose of active participation in hostilities. Thomas Lubanga coordinated 
the group’s actions and had the final say over the group’s activities.222 Thomas Lubanga 
was found guilty under art 25(3)(a) of conscripting and enlisting children under the age of 
15 by way of control over the crime. 
 
In its reasoning, the Pre-Trial Chamber held that art 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute covers 
three types of perpetration: direct perpetration (commission of a crime), co-perpetration 
(commission of a crime “jointly with another”) and indirect perpetration (commission of a 
crime “through another”, regardless of whether that other person is criminally 
responsible).223 The Pre-Trial Chamber used the control theory as the theoretical basis for 
the entire scheme of liability under art 25. The control theory is based on the writings of 
the German criminal law scholar Claus Roxin. Claus Roxin’s control theory equates control 
over the crime with domination over the commission of a crime.224 Such control over the 
crime can take different forms, including functional domination or domination over the 
will of a physical perpetrator. Generally, the control theory considers that a defendant who 
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has control over a crime (Tatherrschaft) can be liable as a perpetrator.225 The elements of 
each mode of perpetration under art 25(3)(a) are outlined below. 
1 Co-perpetration 
 
Co-perpetration is based on the idea that the sum of co-ordinated contributions results in 
the realisation of a crime (horizontal liability). Any person making an essential contribution 
can be responsible.226 Co-perpetration inculpates an individual if they exercise joint control 
with another over the commission of a crime.227  
 
The actus reus requirements for co-perpetration under art 25(3)(a) are an agreement or 
common plan228 and an essential contribution (“joint control”) of the accused over the 
commission of the crime229 (a retroactive analysis).230 The mens rea requirements for co-
perpetration under art 25(3)(a) are the requisite mental state of the accused for the 
underlying crime,231 the accused’s awareness and acceptance of the crime,232 and the 
accused’s awareness of joint control (the accused must be aware that without their 
contribution to the common plan, the plan cannot succeed).233 
 
(a) Essential contribution 
 
Co-perpetration differs from JCE I in that a perpetrator is required to make an “essential” 
contribution to the common plan. For JCE I, “assistance in” or “contribution to” the 
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common plan is sufficient.234 The “essential” contribution requirement is derived from 
Claus Roxin’s control theory of co-perpetration.235  
 
By way of example, a political leader and a military commander together develop a plan to 
ethnically cleanse a certain territory by ordering killings, deportations, and torture. The 
political leader and the military commander would be liable for direct perpetration if they 
physically committed the killings, deportations, or torture themselves. The political leader 
and the military commander would only be liable for co-perpetration, however, if they 
made an essential contribution to the crime. An essential contribution is defined as a 
contribution that could frustrate the commission of the crime.236 In addition, the political 
leader and military commander must fulfil the relevant mens rea requirements in order to 
be liable under co-perpetration.237  
 
The Pre-Trial Chamber further explained what an essential contribution looks like. Co-
perpetration is rooted in the notion of a division of essential tasks for the purposes of 
committing a crime.238 As a result, an “essential” contribution can be evaluated in light of 
the objectives of a group of co-perpetrators, events leading up to crimes committed, and 
the creation and structures of a group.239 Credible witness testimony that the political leader 
and military leader provided necessary finances or logistical support to crimes may be a 
sufficiently essential contribution.240 The political leader or military leader need not have 
“full control” over subordinates.241 The political leader or military leader’s “ultimate 
authority” is not nullified by virtue of delegation of a large number of significant tasks.242 
A leader need not be involved in “every detail” of decisions in order to have made an 
essential contribution to a common plan.243  
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2 Indirect perpetration 
 
Indirect perpetration (perpetration by means) inculpates an individual who uses another 
person as a means to commit a crime. This is otherwise known as the perpetrator behind 
the perpetrator.244 Broadly, indirect perpetration can convict a defendant who has control 
over an organised apparatus of power (vertical liability).245 Indirect perpetration is also 
based on German legal doctrine. In particular, indirect perpetration is substantively similar 
to Claus Roxin’s notion of Organisationsherrschaft.246 Organisationscherrschaft is an 
organisational variant of the control theory.247 Indirect perpetration looks like it performs 
a similar function to command responsibility: both involve control over an organised 
structure. Despite this similarity, command responsibility is a lesser form of liability for 
omission. Indirect perpetration instead labels a defendant as a principal, and is therefore 
capable of labelling high-level leaders occupying the highest positions of power 
appropriately. 
 
The actus reus requirements for perpetration by means under art 25(3)(a) are hierarchical 
relations between parties, a sufficient number of subordinates, sufficient exercise of control 
by the accused (such as capacity to hire, train, or discipline subordinates), and exercise of 
authority by the accused in order to commit a crime.248 The mens rea requirements for 
perpetration by means under art 25(3)(a) are the requisite mental state of the accused for 
the underlying crime as well as “the accused’s awareness of the character of their 
organisations, their authority within the organization, and the factual circumstances 
enabling near-automatic compliance with orders”.249  
 
In practice, indirect perpetration applies to a situation where a leader (whether military, 
political or civilian) occupies such a position of power as to be hierarchically above 
subordinates and control a sufficient number of subordinates. If this is the case, that leader 
can be convicted as an indirect co-perpetrator under art 25(3)(a) so long as the mens rea 
requirements are fulfilled. It is worth noting that indirect perpetration requires a certain 
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amount of evidence in order to successfully convict a defendant. The Pre-Trial Chamber 
held that even if a leader is at the apex of an organisation, it does not necessarily follow 
that they have fulfilled the actus reus requirements of indirect perpetration.250 The absence 
of a “centralised and effective” chain of command militates against the conclusion that a 
group was an organised apparatus of power or that the leader wielded control over 
subordinates.251  
3 Indirect co-perpetration 
 
The concept of indirect co-perpetration was first introduced by the Pre-Trial Chamber in 
Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Matheiu Ngudjolo Chui (Decision on the Confirmation 
of Charges) (Katanga and Ngudjolo Decision on the Confirmation of Charges).252 In 
addition to perpetration, co-perpetration, and indirect perpetration, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
introduced indirect co-perpetration as a mode of principal liability. This so-called “new 
axis” of diagonal liability is a combination of co-perpetration (horizontal liability) and 
indirect perpetration (vertical liability). 
 
The actus reus requirements for indirect co-perpetration involve elements of co-
perpetration and indirect perpetration. All of the actus reus elements of co-perpetration 
must be proved: an agreement or common plan253 and an essential contribution (“joint 
control”.254 All the actus reus elements of indirect perpetration must also be proved 
(hierarchical relations between parties, a sufficient number of subordinates, sufficient 
exercise of control by the accused, and the exercise of authority by the accused).255 
 
The mens rea requirements for indirect co-perpetration also involve elements of co-
perpetration and elements of indirect perpetration. A defendant must have the requisite 
mental state of the defendant for the underlying crime (a mens rea requirement of both co-
perpetration and indirect perpetration),256 an awareness and acceptance of the crime 
occurring257 and an awareness of the factual circumstances enabling them to exercise joint 
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control.258 The defendant must also be aware of their essential role in the implementation 
of the common plan, and of their ability to frustrate the implementation of the common 
plan.259 
 
A simple illustration of this complex concept is offered by Thomas Weigend.260 A and B 
carry out a common design to commit arson at a victim’s house. A takes their youngest 
child (a) and B also takes their youngest child (b) to the victim’s house. A and B then 
instruct these children to make a fire. A and B are co-perpetrators of arson. A and B are 
also indirect perpetrators of arson. To this extent, co-perpetration and indirect perpetration 
factually coincide261 as opposed to being a “fourth alternative of liability”.262 To extend 
this illustration, a civilian leader and a military commander would be liable for indirect co-
perpetration if they each sufficiently exercised control over a group of men, but a crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Rome Statute could not have occurred without the 
combination of both groups of men. Even if one leader’s men actually committed such a 
crime, the other leader would be liable for the genocide if his participation (for example, 
contributing a group of men to the crime) was essential.  
 
A third example shows the utility of indirect co-perpetration as a form of principal liability 
for high-level leaders. In Katanga and Ngudjolo Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 
the Pre-Trial Chamber defined the elements of indirect perpetration before noting the 
respective roles of the two defendants in question. Ethnic distinctions made it unlikely that 
Ngitis would comply with the orders of Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui or Lendu’s would comply 
with the orders of Germain Katanga.263 As mentioned in Part II, these crimes committed 
could only have been perpetrated by the combined forces of Germain Katanga and Mathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui’s troops. The Pre-Trial Chamber concluded that based on these facts, it was 
“critical” to establish the leaders’ horizontal sharing of responsibility through co-
perpetration.264 Indirect co-perpetration was therefore a tool created by the Pre-Trial 
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Chamber to potentially mutually attribute the separate liabilities of Germain Katanga and 
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui.  
C Distinguishing JCE 
 
Prior to the Lubanga Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, commentators speculated 
as to whether the ICC would read in JCE – either in a wholesale manner or in part – as a 
legitimate interpretation of the Rome Statute.265 One solution in the Lubanga Decision on 
the Confirmation of Charges was to equivocate art 25(3)(a) of the Statute with JCE I.266 
The Pre-Trial Chamber in the Lubanga Decision on the Confirmation of Charges chose not 
to adopt the doctrine of JCE.267 Essentially, the Pre-Trial Chamber associated JCE with 
what it termed a ‘subjective’ approach to liability that unduly focused on the state of mind 
of an accused.268 In its reasoning the Pre-Trial Chamber identified three approaches to art 
25(3)(a).  
 
An objective approach to art 25(3)(a) focuses on the realisation of objective elements of 
the crime, and therefore only physical perpetrators can be liable as principals.269 In contrast, 
a subjective approach to art 25(3)(a) emphasises the state of mind in which a contribution 
to the crime is made, and therefore those who contribute with a shared intent to commit the 
common plan can be liable as principals.270 JCE uses this subjective approach.271 Lastly, a 
“control over the crime” approach to art 25(3)(a) does not limit principals to physical 
perpetrators. High-level leaders who control or mastermind a crime’s commission through 
exertion of control, even if temporally or geographically remote from a crime, can be liable 
as principals.272 This nexus is broken, however, if a defendant does not make an essential 
contribution to the commission of the crime.273 In sum, the control theory involves an 
objective element (factual circumstances for exercising control) and a subjective element 
(awareness of circumstances).274 
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The Pre-Trial Chamber concluded that art 25(3)(a) is irreconcilable with an objective 
approach. The phrase “through another” has the ability to convict perpetrators other than 
physical perpetrators. This is consistent with art 25(3)(a)’s normative approach to 
liability.275 Subsequently, the Pre-Trial Chamber concluded that art 25(3)(a) is 
irreconcilable with a subjective approach.276 Essentially, the Pre-Trial Chamber’s rationale 
was that art 25(3) codifies a hierarchy of crimes. Part D of this section will analyse whether 
art 25(3) does codify a hierarchy of crimes. At this stage, it is sufficient to note that the 
ICC’s statutory basis for rejecting a subjective approach is questionable.277  
D A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing? 
 
In refusing to apply JCE, some scholars argue that the ICC became associated with an 
analytically rigorous approach to international criminal law.278 The present paper instead 
finds more sympathy with the view that the ICC has used judicial creativity in its 
judgments.279 The following will evaluate the merits of the control theory. Part 1 will 
evaluate how heavily the control theory draws on domestic law. Part 2 will analyse whether 
an essential contribution to the criminal design is the most appropriate requirement of co-
perpetration and indirect co-perpetration. Part 3 will analyse whether art 25(3)(a) codifies 
a hierarchy of crimes, and Part 4 will evaluate the status of advertent recklessness under 
art 25(3)(a). 
1 Domestic law? 
 
Current international law is characterised by a “sweeping receptivity” to German domestic 
law.280 The ICC’s recourse to German domestic law in interpreting art 25(3)(a) may prove 
problematic in future cases. As Judge Van den Wyngaert noted, the ICC’s universalist 
mission does not sit well with the direct importation of German legal doctrine.281 In 
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addition, art 22 of the Statute states a crime shall be construed strictly and cannot be 
extended by analogy (in dubio pro reo).282 Such explicit statements limit the ICC’s ability 
to import concepts of domestic law that are not general principles of international law per 
art 21. Though the control theory has been applied in legal traditions other than Germany, 
Judge Van den Wyngaert argues that it is unlikely that the control theory has reached the 
status of a general principle of international law.283 Part V will evaluate this issue of 
whether the control theory is a general principle of domestic law. 
 
More specifically, the term “hierarchical relations” draws heavily on domestic law. In 
Katanga and Ngudjolo Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
held that a high-level leader’s control over another can be exerted through an 
organisation.284 Such an organisation is based on hierarchical relations between superiors 
and subordinates.285 Problematically, the phrase “hierarchical relations” is a direct 
reflection of Claus Roxin’s theory of Organisationsherrscheft. In a similar way, art 
25(3)(a) uses the phrase “through another person”, but indirect perpetration convicts a 
defendant for perpetration through an organisation. An argument can be made that there is 
a fundamental difference between the word “person” and the abstract legal entity that is an 
“organisation”.286  
 
Some commentators suggest that the term ‘organisation’ as used by the ICC is just “legal 
shorthand” for control exercised over a physical perpetrator.287 On this basis, a defendant 
could commit an offence “through” (by virtue of an organisational structure) the physical 
perpetrator. Other arguments are advanced on policy grounds. For example, the growing 
importance of legal organisations in international criminal law may justify the ICC’s 
interpretation of the term ‘person’ as an organisation.288 The fact remains, however, that 
the terms ‘organisations’ and ‘hierarchical relations’ are a direct reflection of German legal 
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scholarship. 289 Part V will examine in further depth whether the ICC can draw upon 
German legal scholarship in this manner. 
 
It is worth noting that a defendant’s control over a physical perpetrator is not watered down 
if control is exerted through an organisation. This is in contrast to Judge Van den 
Wyngaert’s critique of indirect perpetration. Her Excellency argues that reading 
‘organisation’ into the word ‘person’ is problematic because a defendant’s control over 
physical perpetrators is less. Her Excellency’s reasoning is that organisation control 
dehumanises a high-level leader’s relationship with a subordinate.290 A defendant’s control 
over a perpetrator is not, however, diluted if exerted through an organisation. Claus Roxin’s 
theory posited that organisational control is immediate: in other words, subordinates often 
carry out the orders of a leader immediately.291 Judge Van den Wyngaert’s questioning of 
the word ‘person’ being read as ‘organisation’ validly points out the heavy-handed 
influence of German legal scholarship in the ICC’s jurisprudence but incorrectly concludes 
that organisational control is a diluted form of control.  
2 Essential contribution to the crime? 
 
Judges292 and scholars293 disagree as to the type of contribution a defendant must make in 
order to be liable as a co-perpetrator.294 The phrase “commits… jointly with another” does 
not specify the substantive elements of co-perpetration. At best, the only inference that can 
be made from “commits… jointly with another” is that co-perpetration requires a common 
plan, either express or implied.295 The Pre-Trial Chamber in the Lubanga Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges held that “commits… jointly with another” requires a defendant 
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to make an essential contribution to the common plan.296 The Pre-Trial Chamber’s standard 
of “essential contribution” has been criticised as both too narrow and too broad.297 
 
Three other types of contribution have been suggested by ICC judges. Firstly, the Trial 
Chamber in Lubanga (Judgment) held that the common plan need not be intrinsically 
criminal, but as a minimum the common plan must include a “critical element” of 
criminality.298 Secondly, Judge Fulford argues that “commits… jointly with another” 
means that “any” contribution to the common plan is sufficient provided there is a causal 
link between the individual’s contribution and the crime.299 The implementation of the 
criminal plan must embody a sufficient risk that a crime will be committed if events follow 
an ordinary course.300 Thirdly, Judge Van den Wyngaert criticises Judge Fulford’s causal 
interpretation as too elastic and instead suggests that a “direct” contribution to the common 
plan is sufficient.301  
 
The Pre-Trial Chamber’s “essential” requirement is the most appropriate threshold for a 
contribution to the crime. Judge Fulford’s ‘causal link’ requirement could lead to artificial, 
speculative reasoning about what might have happened in absence of a defendant’s 
contribution.302 In addition, Judge Fulford’s test has the potential to look like an essential 
contribution test. Judge Van den Wyngaert’s ‘directness’ requirement undermines the fact 
that co-perpetration involves the division of labour. If every co-perpetrator needed to 
directly bring about an offence, the concept of co-perpetration would become redundant: 
every co-perpetrator could be convicted as an individual perpetrator.303 Requiring high-
level leaders to make an “essential contribution” to a crime reduces the likelihood that a 
high-level leader will be held responsible by mere association or for acts that they had no 
control over.304  
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3 Hierarchy of crimes? 
 
Some authors propose that art 25(3) codifies a hierarchy of offences.305 What this means is 
that liability under art 25(3)(a) is considered most blameworthy, and liability under art 
25(3)(d) is considered least blameworthy.306 The ICC in its subsequent jurisprudence has 
affirmed that art 25(3) codifies a hierarchy denoting the seriousness of crimes.307 The 
language of individual criminal responsibility found in art 25 does not in itself create a 
hierarchy of crimes. Judge Fulford argues that there is no proper basis for concluding that 
art 25(3)(b) crimes of ordering, soliciting, or inducing a crime are any less serious than art 
25(3)(a)’s crime of commission “through another”.308 In a similar manner to Judge Fulford, 
Judge Van den Wyngaert does not accept the hierarchy of crimes premise on which the 
control theory is based.309  
 
The strongest argument against a hierarchy of offences is that there is no normative 
relationship between art 25(3)(a)’s modes of liability. The art 25(3)(c) crime of accessorial 
liability is no more serious than art 25(3)(d)’s crime inculpating those who participate in 
group criminality.310 Similarly, the art 25(3)(b) crime of ordering, soliciting or inducing 
the commission of a crime is no more serious than the art 25(3)(c) crime of accessorial 
liability. As some scholars note, the ICC has been “too rigorous in drawing lines according 
to the vague legislative concepts embodied in article 25(3)(a)”.311 Article 25(3) merely 
provides judges with a variety of modes of participation to choose from.312 The only point 
of clarity is that art 25(3)(a)’s status as a mode of principal liability is more blameworthy 
than art 25(3)(c)’s status as a mode of accessorial liability. Sub articles (3)(b), (c) and (d), 
however, cannot be said to be arranged in a hierarchy of seriousness. A hierarchy of crimes 
contradicts the Rome Statute’s normative approach to liability. 
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4 Advertent recklessness? 
 
Some ICC Chambers have held that advertent recklessness (dolus eventualis) is not a part 
of the Rome Statute – instead, knowledge that a consequence will occur in the ordinary 
course of events requires virtual certainty.313 The Pre-Trial Chamber, however, has ruled 
differently. In the Lubanga Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber explicitly accepted the standard of advertent recklessness.314 This standard of 
advertent recklessness does not require that a common plan be criminal, and only requires 
an awareness and acceptance of a risk that a crime will occur. The Pre-Trial Chamber 
endorsed this interpretation in obiter as advertent recklessness was not relied upon.315  
 
The drafting history of the Rome Statute suggests that dolus eventualis was banished by 
consensus. A draft Preparatory Committee report in 1996 explicitly referred to advertent 
recklessness but this section was removed from the draft Statute.316 Some scholars 
concluded that reading advertent recklessness into the Statute is “in the teeth” of the 
Statute’s language and history.317 Article 30 of the Rome Statute may, however, provide a 
limited avenue for dolus eventualis. Article 30(1) of the Statute states that “unless 
otherwise provided” a defendant must have the mens rea requirements of intent and 
knowledge. Mohamed Badar, however, states that in the context of liability under art 
25(3)(a) dolus eventualis is insufficient for a defendant to be liable. 318 This reasoning is 
sound: art 25(3)(a) as codified does not “otherwise provide” for dolus eventualis. 
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V Future Prosecutions At The ICC 
 
The quest for a theory of criminal responsibility is a continuous one.319 Whilst the influence 
of ad hoc tribunals should not be understated, the most important issue for future 
international law prosecutions is an appropriate theory of participation for the ICC. 
President Meron in his address to the United Nations (UN) Security Council anticipated 
that the ICTY would close in 2017.320 In contrast, the ICC is in its infancy. As with the 
International Court of Justice and the ICTY, the ICC can only become credible over a long 
period of time.321 Part A will assess the control theory by way of comparison to JCE and 
will evaluate the control theory’s flexibility. Part B will question whether amending the 
Rome Statute is viable. Part C will identify the steps that the ICC should take in its future 
jurisprudence, including discussion of the control theory’s status as a general principle of 
law and clarifying its interpretation of art 25(3).  
A Assessing The Control Theory 
 
The single greatest hurdle that the Rome Statute poses to inculpating high-level leaders is 
its lack of a mode of liability expressly inculpating high-level leaders. Judge Van den 
Wyngaert notes that “for better or worse… Article 25(3)(a) only contains basic and 
traditional forms of criminal responsibility” and that “any attempt to overextend the label 
of ‘commission’ to reach the intellectual authors or masterminds of international crimes is 
thus fraught with legal and conceptual difficulties”.322 In Judge Van den Wyngaert’s view, 
the Trial Chamber’s adoption of the control theory goes “well beyond” a strict 
interpretation of the Statute.323 
 
The Rome Statute does not express the elements of principal liability for high-level leaders. 
Yet to preclude the ICC from prosecuting high-level leaders on the basis that the Statute 
provides only for ‘basic and traditional’ forms of criminal responsibility is to frustrate the 
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raison d’être of the ICC. The very purpose of the Rome Statute and the ICC is to fight 
against impunity for the commission of the “most serious crimes to mankind”.324 The 
Statute states that “the most serious crimes of concern” must not go unpunished and that 
effective prosecution is achieved through “international co-operation”.325 The ICC should 
strive to close the impunity gap and should not shield high-level leaders from liability on 
the basis that the Rome Statute’s drafters didn’t explicitly design a mode of liability fit for 
the orchestrators of mass atrocity. 
 
Article 25(3)(a) envisages liability for a defendant who commits a crime “with another” or 
“through another”. Relative to the ICTY Statute and the ICTR Statute, this is neither basic 
nor traditional. Commission of a crime “through another” is a form of intellectual 
perpetration. On balance, Wyngaert J’s statement that art 25(3)(a) only codifies “basic, 
traditional modes of responsibility” is qualified by the inclusion of intellectual perpetration. 
The Pre-Trial Chamber held that commission of a crime “through another” is a typical 
manifestation of control over the crime.326 Some authors go so far as to argue that “through 
another” is a classic manifestation of Claus Roxin’s’s concept of täter hinter dem täter (the 
perpetrator behind the perpetrator327).328 These authors go too far: the drafting history of 
the Rome Statute suggests no single doctrine underpinning art 25(3). 
 
The ICC should not be precluded from prosecuting high-level leaders under art 25(3)(a) 
purely because the Rome Statute’s drafters may not have foreseen the exact statutory 
phrasing required to make a high-level leader culpable. One commentator notes that the 
Rome Statute’s drafters included diplomats who had no practical criminal law 
experience.329 Other commentators note that the United Nations (UN) Office of Legal 
Affairs provided support in the drafting process.330 Regardless of this level of expertise at 
the drafting stage, it is difficult to argue that the lack of an express liability for high-level 
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leaders should preclude the ICC from fulfilling its function of prosecuting the most 
responsible leaders. 
1 Comparison to JCE 
 
It is unlikely that JCE will be applied by the ICC in future. This is primarily because the 
ICC explicitly rejected a subjective approach to art 25(3)(a).331 JCE, relative to the control 
theory, is a subjective approach to liability.332 In addition, even if the ICC were to overrule 
itself, JCE is based on customary international law.333 The sources of law which the ICC 
can draw upon differ from those at ad hoc tribunals such as the ICTY.334 More specifically, 
customary international law plays a more dominant role in the ICTY than the ICC.335 This 
does not diminish the value of JCE. JCE is one of the two major forms of principal liability 
in international law. By way of illustration, JCE continues to be applied in ad hoc 
Tribunals.336  
 
More importantly, JCE’s strengths and weaknesses are a useful comparative tool. Though 
the ICC is unlikely to apply JCE, the control theory’s effects are not dissimilar to those of 
JCE. The ICTY Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v Milomir Stakic (Judgment) (Stakic) 
acknowledged that the end result of co-perpetration is similar to that of JCE “and even 
overlaps in part”.337 In addition, JCE III and the concept of indirect co-perpetration have a 
similar effect. JCE III can convict a defendant for crimes outside a common plan if those 
additional crimes were a foreseeable and natural consequence of the common plan.338 
Indirect co-perpetration can convict a defendant for the conduct of a physical perpetrator, 
even if the defendant did not exercise direct influence over this person nor share any intent 
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with them.339 This is the precise fact situation in the Katanga and Ngudjolo Decision on 
the Confirmation of Charges. Both JCE III and indirect co-perpetration allow a defendant 
to be inculpated for risk-taking behaviour.340  
On balance, indirect co-perpetration is a more restrained mode of principal liability than 
JCE III. Indirect co-perpetration requires a defendant to make an essential contribution to 
a crime.341 In contrast, the actus reus of JCE merely requires a defendant to assist in or 
contribute to the common purpose.342 As one ICTY Chamber noted, the stronger a 
defendant’s contribution to a common plan, the less likely a defendant is held guilty by 
mere association.343 The future of indirect co-perpetration is unclear. It has not, so far, been 
used to successfully convict a defendant. The Appeals Chamber in a recent judgment left 
the status of indirect co-perpetration open to further litigation.344 In this vein, Part C will 
discuss the future of indirect co-perpetration at the ICC.  
2 Flexibility 
 
A theory of participation must be flexible enough to convict different types of high-level 
leaders. This is based on the fact that serious violations of international humanitarian war 
differ in their nature and in their complexity.345 A contrasting position is taken by Judge 
Van den Wyngaert. Her Excellency proposes that the acts of high-level leaders will “very 
often” not fit the mould of principal liability.346 Her Excellency explains that in this 
situations, high-level leaders are sometimes more appropriately labelled as accessories 
rather than as perpetrators. Whilst this may be true, it does not mean that principal liability 
for high-level leaders is a rigid mould. International law should instead resist the temptation 
to make all instances of atrocity fit a mould.347 As shown by the Srebrenica genocide, high-
level leaders may be remote from a crime scene despite contributing in a large way to its 
contribution. The control theory adequately addresses this situation: indirect co-
                                                 
339  Fry, above n 42, at 220. 
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perpetration can be used to convict high-level leaders in the absence of direct control or 
shared intent. 
 
By way of contrast, Argentina’s dirty war took place in a climate of deliberate arbitrariness. 
Senior leaders sometimes had control over subordinates and sometimes did not.348 The 
control theory also adequately deals with this situation. Indirect perpetration distinguishes 
a defendant who has joint control over a crime from a defendant who does not. 
Alternatively, co-perpetration requires a defendant to make an essential contribution to the 
relevant crime under the Rome Statute. This means that in the situation of Argentina’s dirty 
war, the control theory could not convict a senior leader who did not either exercise joint 
control over a crime or contribute in some essential way to that crime. 
 
A theory of participation must be able to convict both highly organised and highly 
disorganised leaders if such leaders have sufficient power over subordinates. Scholars note 
that the control theory was designed to convict leaders in the rigid hierarchies of Nazi 
Germany.349 Some scholars argue that Roxin’s control theory only works if a high level 
leader’s organisational rubric is highly structured.350 To this extent, Stefano Manacorda 
and Chantal Meloni argue that the control theory can convict high-level leaders within a 
structured context, but indirect perpetration’s hierarchical structure is less appropriate for 
crimes committed in an informal context.351 Gerhard Werle and Boris Burghardt question 
whether the control theory applies well to the more informal FRPI and FNI militias in 
Katanga and Ngudjolo Decision on the Confirmation of Charges.352  
 
Whilst indirect co-perpetration was not able to be used to successfully convict Germain 
Katanga, the control theory is overall the most coherent method to assign responsibility to 
high-level leaders. The control theory can reflect the culpability of indirect perpetrators 
who orchestrate crime from a distance.353 Jens Ohlin applies a ‘shared intentions’ theory 
to various situations in order to show shortcomings of the control theory.354 Jens Ohlin’s 
shared intentions analysis, however, does not provide a method of distinguishing between 
principals and accessories. Jens Ohlin’s proposed solution is a binary mode of liability – a 
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defendant would either co-perpetrate a JCE, or aid and abet a JCE. Though this is a 
reasonable proposition, it does not fit well with the strict wording of the Rome Statute. 
Direct perpetration, co-perpetration and indirect co-perpetration are explicitly codified by 
art 25(3)(a) whereas aiding and abetting are explicitly codified by art 25(3)(c). It is unlikely 
that the ICC will interpret art 25(3)(a) as capable of both principal liability and accessorial 
liability. 
B Amending the Rome Statute? 
 
In order for the Rome Statute to be redrafted, State parties must consent to a new mode of 
liability aimed at political leaders. The difficulty in drafting the Rome Statute in the first 
instance suggests that this process is likely difficult to achieve and, whilst desirable, 
unrealistic. A mode of perpetration appropriate for the ICC, in lieu of Rome Statute 
redrafting, should focus itself within the confines of the Statute. This paper notes that the 
potential adoption of the crime of aggression into the Statute could impact upon the 
conviction of high-level leaders. This paper also notes that a potentially viable amendment 
to the Statute would be a mode of principal liability based on planning. Planning is arguably 
the most suitable mode of responsibility to prosecute the intellectual authors of crime.355 
The word “planning” is absent from the text of the Rome Statute. Amending the Statute by 
way of providing for planning liability may be a viable option for the ICC. In lieu of this 
unlikely scenario, the following will consider how the ICC in its jurisprudence can best 
clarify art 25(3)(a).  
C Interpreting Article 25(3)(a) 
 
Given the separate opinions that have questioned the viability of the ICC’s control theory, 
Sofia Lord argues that the ICC is likely to change some of its initial rulings.356 Judge 
Tarfusser in a Dissenting Opinion in the Appeals Chamber held that case law on art 25(3) 
was “far from being uncontentious or settled”.357 To this extent, the ICC may in its future 
prosecutions weigh the relative merits of alternate interpretations of art 25(3)(a) that fit 
within the confines of the Rome Statute. The quest continues for a satisfactory answer to 
the question posed by judges and scholars alike: how can the high-level perpetrators of 
crime best be held to account in a manner concordant with the principles of international 
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law? The following will analyse the best steps that the ICC can take in its future art 25(3)(a) 
prosecutions.  
 
The ICC must first and foremost clarify and rebut criticisms of its interpretation of art 
25(3). Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that a treaty 
shall be interpreted in “in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms 
of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose”.358 In addition, art 22(2) 
of the Rome Statute states that the Statute must be strictly construed and cannot be extended 
by analogy to domestic law. Article 21, however, enables the ICC to draw on general 
principles of international law.359 With this in mind, the following will evaluate the merits 
of various interpretive options open to the ICC. 
1 General principle of law 
 
The ICC is limited in the sources of law it can draw on. Article 21 of the Rome Statute 
enables judges to draw primarily on the Rome Statute, the Elements of Crime, the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence.360 Article 21 also allows judges to draw on treaties and principles 
and rules of international of law.361 Article 21 also allows judges to draw on general 
principles of national law.362 Yet when the Pre-Trial Chamber read Claus Roxin’s control 
theory into art 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute, it was unclear whether the ICC engaged in 
statutory interpretation, recognising customary international law or principles of 
international law, or relying on general principles of law.363   
 
The first possibility, that the control theory was based on statutory analysis, is 
irreconcilable with the fact that the Rome Statute is based on a variety of domestic legal 
traditions. The second possibility, that the Pre-Trial Chamber based the control theory on 
customary law, is also unlikely: customary international law requires widespread or 
uniform state practice.364 The third possibility is that the Pre-Trial Chamber relied on the 
control theory as a general principle of law. This possibility still requires the control theory 
to be a “general principle of law derived by the Court from the national law of legal systems 
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of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of states that would normally 
exercise jurisdiction over the crime” but of the three options, this is most likely.365 Does 
the control theory reach this status?  
 
At best, the control theory could be said to reach the status. Contrary to comments in some 
jurisprudence,366 the control theory is not unique to German domestic law.367 The Pre-Trial 
Chamber held that the control theory has been increasingly used in national jurisdictions368 
and is “widely recognised in legal doctrine”.369 More specifically, indirect perpetration is 
recognised in major legal systems.370  The most promising domestic example of indirect 
perpetration is its codification in the American Moral Penal Code.371 Another national 
court that has referred to indirect perpetration is the Argentinean Court of Appeal.372  
 
Despite these positive indications, however, the ICC has not engaged in a comprehensive 
analysis of whether the control theory is a general principle of law. Some scholars373 point 
out that the Pre-Trial Chamber cited only German and Spanish law for the proposition that 
the control theory is widely used.374 The critical scrutiny given to the objective and 
subjective approaches is notably absent from the Pre-Trial Chamber’s treatment of the 
control theory. The uncritical importation of a domestic law concept into international 
criminal law is an unenviable result. In order to justify its adoption of the control theory, 
the ICC must explicitly and more thoroughly analyse the status of the control theory as a 
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general principle of law.375 The ICC should analyse whether the control theory is a general 
principle pursuant to art 22(1)(c). 
2 Points of clarification 
 
The ICC’s control theory has relatively fewer inconsistencies than JCE. Nevertheless, in 
the fact of dissenting judgments and academic critique, the ICC’s jurisprudence would 
benefit from clearly articulating a few points of contention. The ICC in its future 
jurisprudence should therefore clarify the following. The ICC should rebut Judge Fulford’s 
causal link standard and Judge Van den Wyngaert’s directness standard, and affirm itself 
in terms of requiring an essential contribution to the common plan. The ICC could, in 
obiter, rebuke the arguments of some scholars asserting that art 25(3) does codifies a 
hierarchy of crimes. Instead, art 25(3) merely offers judges a range of modes of 
participation to choose from.376 It is, however, important to note that international tribunals 
may choose not to overrule themselves. By way of illustration, the ICTY, despite being 
able to overrule its own rules,377 is still plagued by inconsistencies in its jurisprudence 10 
years on from its inception.378 
3 Cluster of factors 
 
Jens Ohlin, Elies van Sliedregt and Thomas Weigend are concerned that the wide scope of 
the control theory leaves little room left for accessorial liability.379 A co-perpetrator does 
not have to be present at the scene of the crime.380 It is sufficient for a co-perpetrator to 
provide assistance in the formulation of a common plan.381 It is also sufficient for a co-
perpetrator to direct or control other participants.382 Finally, a co-perpetrator can determine 
the roles of others involved in the offence.383 A direct or physical link between the co-
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perpetrator’s contribution and the commission of the crimes is unnecessary.384 All of these 
contributions can be quite remote, temporally and geographically, from the realisation of 
the criminal plan.385 What is the plight of a scientist who provides critical information 
enabling a high-level leader to produce chemical weapons?386 Or a geographer who 
provides a route through rough terrain enabling a high-level leader to commit genocide?  
 
International criminal law should be able to distinguish individuals at the centre of a 
criminal offence from those at the margins.387 The inability of the essentiality requirement 
to distinguish between ‘centre’ and ‘peripheral’ offenders does not mean that either the 
essentiality requirement or the control theory should be abandoned. Rather, some scholars 
propose that an additional “cluster of factors” should determine whether a defendant should 
be liable as a perpetrator or as an accessory.388 This proposed cluster of factors would 
ultimately be a normative judgment of fair attribution: judges would on a case by case basis 
weigh this cluster of factors. Jens Ohlin, Elies van Sliedregt and Thomas Weigend suggest 
that a “cluster of factors” analysis could include subjective factors such as whether there is 
a joint “meshing” of subplans amongst co-perpetrators389 or a strong personal interest in 
the success of the criminal enterprise (well beyond a minimal mens rea requirement).390 
Objective factors may include an “element of immediacy” in that a temporally-close 
contribution to the crime pushes towards liability as a perpetrator; another suggestion is 
that only those who participate in the crime after the stage of attempt is reached should be 
co-perpetrators. 
4 Indirect co-perpetration 
 
Indirect co-perpetration may represent the future of international criminal prosecutions.391 
Many recent indictments have relied on indirect co-perpetration as a means of prosecuting 
a defendant.392 The Pre-Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v Al-Bashir (Warrant of Arrest) 
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pleaded indirect co-perpetration.393 Indirect co-perpetration is the most recently articulated 
mode of liability under art 25(3)(a). It is unique in that it is capable of attributing both 
vertical (indirect perpetration) and horizontal (co-perpetration) liability. The Appeals 
Chamber in a recent decision neither affirmed nor rejected the validity of indirect co-
perpetration394 leaving the issue of its existence open to further litigation.395 To this extent, 
indirect co-perpetration has the potential to become the darling of prosecutors. 
 
Indirect co-perpetration mutually attributes liability in order to capture complex forms of 
collective violence:396 as mentioned in Part IV, indirect co-perpetration was able to account 
for the situation that crimes committed could only have been perpetrated by the combined 
forces of separate leaders.397 Indirect co-perpetration is capable of convicting participants 
in a similar manner to JCE III.398 Indirect co-perpetration is “what can only be described 
as a truly potent prosecutorial tool”.399 Nevertheless, indirect co-perpetration is not 
unrestrained. By way of defence, indirect co-perpetration is not a fourth manifestation of 
the control theory – it is merely a “factual coincidence” of two recognised modes of 
participation.400 A limiting principle is that a defendant must have known it was possible 
that additional crimes might be committed and must have accepted this possibility.401 In 
addition, indirect co-perpetration cannot convict a defendant if there is a low and 
unaccepted probability that the objective elements of the crime will occur.402 For these 
reasons, indirect co-perpetration has the potential to become the ICC’s chief prosecutorial 
tool. 
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VI Conclusion 
 
The present paper has explored principal liability in international criminal law. 
International criminal law seeks to combat impunity by successfully prosecuting 
individuals who are the most responsible for crimes. High-level leaders responsible for 
serious violations of international humanitarian law should be labelled as principals to a 
crime, and not as accessories. A high-level leader’s participation in mass atrocity can take 
a number of forms which a theory of participation should be able to account for. The control 
theory has the ability to account for the characteristics of mass atrocity whilst limiting 
liability to defendants who make an essential contribution to a crime. In particular, indirect 
co-perpetration is a potent form of the control theory capable of addressing complex fact 
scenarios. Whether indirect co-perpetration will become the darling of prosecutors is yet 
to be seen. It is of utmost importance, however, that the ICC justify its reliance on the 
control theory. If the control theory’s status is that of a general principle of law, the ICC 
can more justly continue on its mission of ending impunity for high-level leaders.  
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